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The Strange Career of the Transnational
Legal Order of Cannabis Prohibition
By Ely Aaronson*
There is a crack in everything — that’s how the light gets in
Leonard Cohen, Anthem

In an era often characterized as one of growing convergence of the laws
governing criminal activities in different countries, the issue-area of cannabis
policy undergoes processes of fragmentation and polarization. Some countries
continue to criminalize all forms of medical and recreational uses of
cannabis. Others have sought to “separate the market” for cannabis from
that of other drugs by decriminalizing the possession of small amounts of
marijuana, authorizing its use for medical purposes, and establishing
administrative measures for taxing and regulating the commercial sale of the
drug. This Article explores the causes and consequences of the decline of the
transnational legal order of cannabis prohibition. It shows how the erosion
of the regulatory capacities of this transnational legal order reflects deepseated political conflicts over the legitimacy of prohibition norms in this field.
It analyzes the ways in which conflicting regulatory approaches become
institutionalized as a consequence of the structural mismatch between the
actors framing the meaning of cannabis prohibition norms at the
international level and the actors implementing these norms in national and
local contexts. Finally, the Article shows how this transnational legal order
has created path-dependent trajectories of legal change that continue to shape
domestic drug policies.
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INTRODUCTION
With its roots in international treaties signed during the League of Nations
Era, the transnational legal order (TLO) of cannabis prohibition represents one of
the most sustained efforts to develop internationally applicable standards for
governing illicit markets.1 The vast majority of United Nations (UN) member states
are now parties to the three major international drug conventions, which require
criminalizing the production, distribution, and use of cannabis. Over the past
decades, the cannabis prohibition TLO has come to encompass an extensive array
of legal instruments for monitoring implementation efforts,2 disseminating
information on the activities of drug trafficking networks,3 and facilitating
cooperation among national police forces.4 However, despite the extensive
institutionalization of this TLO, cannabis remains the most widely used illegal drug
in the world. The 2018 World Drug Report estimates that at least 192 million people
aged 15–64 had used cannabis in the preceding year.5 With the percentage of adults
reporting cannabis use in North American and European countries far exceeding
the international average, cannabis use has become integrated into mainstream
culture in a large number of countries.6
In an era that is often characterized as one of a growing isomorphism of the
laws and procedures governing criminal activities in different countries,7 the issuearea of cannabis policy undergoes processes of fragmentation and polarization.8
Some countries continue to criminalize all forms of medical and recreational uses
of cannabis. Others have sought to “separate the market” for cannabis from that of
other drugs by decriminalizing the possession of small amounts of marijuana,
1.
PETER ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: CRIMINALIZATION
AND CRIME CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATION 3 (2006).
2. RICHARD H. FRIMAN, Behind the Curtain: Naming and Shaming in International Drug Control, in
THE POLITICS OF LEVERAGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: NAME, SHAME, AND SANCTION 143

(Richard H. Friman ed., 2015).
3. BEN BOWLING, POLICING THE CARIBBEAN: TRANSNATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION
IN PRACTICE 118–20 (2010).
4.
JORG FRIEDRICHS, FIGHTING TERRORISM AND DRUGS: EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL
POLICE COOPERATION (2008).
5. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, World Drug Report 2018: Analysis of Drug Markets 43,
U.N. Sales No. E.18.XI.9 (2018), https://www.unodc.org/wdr2018/prelaunch/WDR18_Booklet_
3_DRUG_ MARKETS.pdf.
6.
HOWARD PARKER ET AL., ILLEGAL LEISURE: THE NORMALIZATION OF ADOLESCENT
RECREATIONAL DRUG USE (1998).
7.
ANJA JAKOBI, COMMON GOODS AND EVILS? THE FORMATION OF GLOBAL CRIME
GOVERNANCE (2013).
8.
DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR, INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL: CONSENSUS FRACTURED
(2012); Caroline Chatwin, UNGASS 2016: Insights from Europe on the Development of Global Cannabis Policy
and the Need for Reform of the Global Drug Policy Regime, 49 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 80 (2017).
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authorizing its use for medical purposes, and establishing administrative measures
for taxing and regulating the commercial sale of the drug.9 These reforms have
gained international momentum despite resistance from key actors in the
international drug control system, including the International Narcotic Control
Board (INCB) and the US federal government.10 The proliferation of cannabisliberalization reform is frequently depicted as a historical step toward the collapse
not only of this TLO but of the entire edifice of the international narcotic control
system of which it forms a part.11
How deep is the current crisis of the cannabis prohibition TLO? What are its
causes and consequences? What does this case study reveal about the conditions
under which criminal justice TLOs rise and fall? In this Article, I explore these
questions to demonstrate the complex ways in which the cannabis prohibition TLO
has served as a battleground between competing conceptions of the role of criminal
law in addressing social and medical harms. Drawing on TLO theory,12 the Article
shows that the capacity of the cannabis prohibition TLO to regulate the practices
of legal actors at the international, national, and local levels has been eroded as a
result of effective contestations of the input and output legitimacy of its governance
endeavors. The rapid and widespread diffusion of new models of decriminalization,
depenalization, and legalization has relied on the operation of mechanisms of
recursive transnational lawmaking. These mechanisms originate from the
indeterminacy of drug prohibition norms, the ideological contradictions between
competing interpretations of their meaning, the impact of diagnostic struggles over
the social issues that the international drug control system should address, and the
mismatch between the actors shaping formal prohibition norms at the international
level and those implementing these norms in national and local contexts. However,
our analysis also shows that the cannabis prohibition TLO creates path-dependent
trajectories that constrain the development of non-punitive strategies for regulating
cannabis markets. In this context, the Article explains why it is too early to sound
the death knell for the prohibitionist agenda of cannabis control. The dense array
of UN treaties, transnational and regional monitoring schemes, national laws, and
local enforcement arrangements put in place throughout the institutionalization of
the cannabis prohibition TLO impede efforts to initiate more progressive regulatory
innovations in this field.
The Article is organized as follows: Section I briefly introduces the historical
formation of the international legal framework governing cannabis regulations. It
9.

For an assessment of different models of cannabis liberalization reform, see ROBIN ROOM
(2010).
10. Bewley-Taylor, supra note 8, at 219–78.
11.
ADAM BLACKWELL, IF THE WAR ON DRUGS IS OVER. . .NOW WHAT? (2015); Wayne
Hall, The Future of the International Drug Control System and National Drug Prohibitions, 113 ADDICTION 1210
(2018).
12. GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (2013);
TERENCE HALLIDAY & GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (2015); Gregory
Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 231 (2016).
ET AL., CANNABIS POLICY: MOVING BEYOND STALEMATE
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also identifies the inherent ambiguities giving rise to interpretive disagreements
regarding the scope of application of cannabis prohibition norms. Section II
examines the debates that evolved during the 1960s–70s regarding the
criminological logic of drug prohibition policies and the cannabis liberalization
reforms shaped by these debates. It then considers the processes leading to the
reversal of these liberalizing trends and the extensive institutionalization of new
measures reinforcing strict interpretations of the prohibition norms enshrined in
the international treaties. Section III discusses the causes and consequences of the
legitimation crisis that the cannabis prohibition TLO has experienced since the mid1990s as well as the global wave of depenalization, decriminalization, and
legalization reforms precipitated by this crisis. Section IV considers the extent to
which this wave of cannabis liberalization reform lessens the impact of the
prohibitionist approach on the development of cannabis regulations at the
international, national, and local levels.
I. CANNABIS PROHIBITIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Cannabis prohibition laws were initially established in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries through disparate national drug control initiatives.13 Over
the course of the nineteenth century, cannabis medical uses were regulated in a
patchwork manner as part of wider legal frameworks governing the production and
sale of pharmaceuticals. In the US, cannabis use began to be perceived as a social
problem that should be a subject of criminal regulation during the Progressive Era.14
This criminalization campaign was inspired by the legislative inroads made by the
temperance movement during that period and by awakening nativist sentiments
toward incoming Mexican migrants, whose habits of marijuana smoking became
major objects of media attention and public anxiety.15 In 1915, California
introduced the nation’s first anti-marijuana criminal prohibition. Three decades
later, such prohibitions appeared in the statute books of forty-six states and a series
of marijuana-related federal offenses were included in the Marijuana Tax Act of
1937.16
The transnational legal ordering of cannabis regulations originated during the
League of Nations era.17 An earlier international drug convention, signed at The
Hague in 1912, focused on regulating opium, morphine, and cocaine and did not
include implementation mechanisms. Under the League’s auspices, new
requirements concerning the regulation of medical and non-medical uses of
cannabis were introduced at the 1925 International Opium Convention. However,

13. Toby Seddon, Inventing Drugs: A Genealogy of a Regulatory Concept, 43 J. L. & SOC’Y 393 (2016).
14.
PETER ANDREAS, SMUGGLER NATION: HOW ILLICIT TRADE MADE AMERICA 253–62
(2013); DAVID MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL (1973).
15. Steven Bender, The Colors of Cannabis: Race and Marijuana, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 689 (2016).
16. ANDREAS, supra note 14, at 268.
17. Paul Knepper, Dreams and Nightmares: Drug Trafficking and the History of International Crime, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 208 (2016).
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the pre-UN frameworks of international drug control did not place emphasis on the
use of punitive measures to regulate cannabis or other psychoactive substances.
Although the US had strongly advocated the introduction of a strict prohibitionist
approach, this position was met with resistance from European colonial powers that
had significant financial interests in the production of opium and coca and the
manufacturing of their derivatives.18 In the absence of an international consensus
regarding the need to strengthen the criminal regulation of illicit drug use, the preUN drug control framework focused on the development of administrative
measures to govern cross-border commodity flows and to encourage a more
effective domestic regulation of local drug markets.19
Following WWII, the growing capacity of the US to shape the rules and
institutions of the international drug control system facilitated the move of the
prohibitionist approach from the periphery to the center of the policy agenda.20 To
a considerable extent, the institutionalization of the cannabis prohibition TLO
provides a paradigmatic example of what has been usefully conceptualized as
“globalized localism”21—a process by which policy models that originated in the
distinctive cultural and institutional contexts of a powerful country come to be
perceived as global standards due to their inclusion in treaties, diagnostic indicators,
interpretive guidelines, and other instruments of transnational legal diffusion. The
introduction of the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961 served as an
important milestone in this process.22 The Convention frames the issue of drug use
as a moral problem, stating in its preamble that “addiction to narcotic drugs
constitutes a serious evil for the individual and is fraught with social and economic
danger to mankind.” In line with this moralizing framing, the Convention requires
signatory countries to criminalize a wide range of drug-related activities. For
example, Article 36 of the Single Conventions reads:
Subject to its constitutional limitations, each party shall adopt such
measures as will ensure that cultivation, production, manufacture,
extraction, preparation, possession, offering for sale, distribution,
purchase, sale, delivery on any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch,
dispatch in transit, transport, importation and exportation of drugs
contrary to the provisions of this Convention . . . shall be punishable
offences when committed intentionally . . . .
The two subsequent UN drug conventions adopted in 1971 and 1988 sought
to extend the application of the prohibitionist approach to new contexts of drug
18.
WILLIAM MCALLISTER, DRUG DIPLOMACY IN THE TWENTY CENTURY: AN
INTERNATIONAL HISTORY (2002).
19. Danilo Ballotta et al., Cannabis Control in Europe, in A CANNABIS READER: GLOBAL ISSUES
AND LOCAL EXPERIENCES 97 (Paul Griffiths ed., 2008).
20. DAVID BEWLEY-TAYLOR, THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
1909-1997, at 118–20 (2002).
21.
BOAVENTURA DE SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLITICS IN PARADIGMATIC TRANSITIONS (1995).
22. NEIL BOISTER, PENAL ASPECTS OF THE UN DRUG CONVENTIONS 67 (2001).
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regulation. Responding to the increasing production and use of synthetic drugs as
part of the rise of the counter-cultural movements of the late 1960s, the 1971
Psychotropic Drug Treaty applied these policy principles to synthetic psychoactive
drugs, such as opioids and amphetamine-type stimulants. The 1988 Convention
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna
Convention) further expanded the array of criminal justice enforcement measures
states are required to adopt. Importantly, however, the mandatory criminalization
norms established by the UN drug conventions are defined in a manner that leaves
two major sources of textual ambiguity regarding their scope of application. First,
the conventions deliberately refrain from providing a definition of what constitutes
medical and scientific uses of drugs. Second, they clarify that countries should
implement the duty to criminalize drug-related activities in accordance with their
domestic constitutional principles. As is often the case, these two provisions are
products of efforts to paper over divergent policy preferences. During the
negotiations of the Single Convention, several countries objected to banning certain
drugs that have traditional and quasi-medical uses among indigenous populations.
India, for example, expressed concerns regarding the implied need to criminalize
traditional uses of bhang, which is made from cannabis leaves with a low
Tetrahydrocannabinol (TOC) content.23 Other countries emphasized the need to
retain interpretive flexibility in light of the possibility that future research would
reveal new medical benefits. The resulting compromise encouraged countries that
would not have otherwise supported the prohibitionist principles set by the treaties
to come on board. However, this compromise also sowed the seeds of later
controversies regarding the ways in which cannabis prohibition norms should be
applied. As the following discussion shows, these controversies will set recursive
processes of transnational legal change in motion, leading to the settling and
unsettling of specific interpretations of the scope and meaning of these norms.24
II. INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: THE EARLY CRISIS OF THE
CANNABIS PROHIBITION TLO
It is an irony of history that the first decade following the entry into force of
the Single Convention experienced a marked increase in the prevalence of cannabis
use in Western countries. When the Single Convention was signed in 1961, cannabis
use was particularly prevalent in developing countries where the plant was
traditionally cultivated, while it had little impact on mainstream culture in North
America and Europe. By the end of the decade, the drug acquired unprecedented
political salience not only in light of objective increases in the prevalence of its use
but also due to its symbolic association with emerging countercultures and the
perceived threat they putatively posed to public morality. These dramatic changes

23.
24.

BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 190.
See Halliday & Shaffer, supra note 12, at 37–42.
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intensified the enforcement of cannabis offenses, but they also attracted heightened
public attention to the negative consequences of such enforcement efforts.
In the late 1960s, there was an historical increase in the rates of arrests,
prosecutions, and convictions of cannabis users in various Western countries. The
magnitude of this change was most remarkable in the US. In California, for example,
the number of people arrested for marijuana offenses increased from about 5,000
in 1960 to 37,514 in 1967.25 Arrests for cannabis possession became increasingly
common in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Canada as well.26 The
civil rights implications of these increased levels of drug law enforcement generated
vigorous public debate on the justifications of treating cannabis on par with other
psychoactive substances that are widely perceived to be more dangerous and
harmful.27 Disagreements regarding whether cannabis should be classified under the
strictest schedules of the UN drug control treaties were already evident during the
Plenipotentiary Conference, which drafted the Single Convention However, it was
only as a result of the increased enforcement of cannabis prohibitions that such
disagreements precipitated domestic forms of political and legal resistance. Due to
increasing public criticism, national governments in several countries appointed
public committees to consider the effectiveness of the existing laws. These
committees directed strong criticism towards the criminological and medical
underpinnings of the prohibitionist approach and sided with proponents of the
decriminalization of mild forms of cannabis use.
In Great Britain, the Advisory Committee on Drugs Dependence (Wootton
Report), published in 1969, concluded:
[The] long term consumption of cannabis in moderate doses has no harmful
effects . . . There is no evidence that this activity is causing violent crime,
or is producing in otherwise normal people conditions of dependence or
psychosis requiring medical treatment . . . there are indications that
(cannabis) may become a functional equivalent of alcohol . . . possession
of a small amount of cannabis should not normally be regarded as a serious
crime to be punished by imprisonment (Home Office 1968).28
Broadly similar conclusions were reached by other committees operating in
the Netherlands (The Baan Commission, 1970 and Hulsman Commission, 1971),
Canada (The Commission of Inquiry into the Nonmedical Use of Drugs, commonly
referred to as the Le Dain Commission, 1973), and Australia (Senate Social
Committee on Social Welfare, 1977).29 In the US, the public debate that followed
25.
EMILY DUFTON, GRASS ROOTS: THE RISE AND FALL AND RISE OF MARIJUANA IN
AMERICA 7 (2017).
26.
DANILO BALLOTTA ET AL., supra note 19, at 101; Tim Van Solinge, The Dutch Model of
Cannabis Decriminalization and Tolerated Retail, in DUAL MARKETS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO
REGULATION 145, 147 (Ernesto Savona et al. eds., 2017).
27. KATHLEEN FRYDL, THE DRUG WAR IN AMERICA, 1940–1973, at 350 (2013).
28.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE, CANNABIS: REPORT BY THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON DRUG DEPENDENCE (1968).
29. DANILO BALLOTTA ET AL., supra note 19, at 112.
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President Nixon’s famous identification of drug abuse as “America’s public enemy
number one” led to the nomination of the National Commission on Marihuana and
Drug Abuse (the Shafer Commission). To the surprise of many, the Commission’s
1972 Report, entitled Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, concurred with the
liberal approach endorsed by other national investigation committees. While the
Commission emphasized that cannabis was not a harmless substance, it stressed
that its dangers had often been overstated. It advocated repealing the criminal
prohibitions on the possession of small amounts of marijuana and establishing
alternative measures to address the public health concerns associated with cannabis
use. Such reforms, the Commission stated, are needed to relieve “the law
enforcement community of the responsibility for enforcing a law of questionable
utility, and one which they cannot fully enforce.”30 These recommendations were
repudiated by the Nixon administration, but they inspired grassroots activists to
mobilize cannabis liberalization reforms at the state and local levels. In 1973,
Oregon became the first state that decriminalized the possession of small amounts
(28.35 grams) of marijuana. Eleven states followed suit during the next half of the
decade.31
The failure of the US national administration to secure the compliance of state
governments with the prohibitionist norms it sought to propagate internationally
provided a clear indication of the decline of the cannabis prohibition TLO.
However, rather than precipitating the global circulation of new models of
cannabis-liberalization reform, this early crisis stimulated new cycles of recursive
transnational lawmaking, leading to the entrenchment of the prohibitionist
approach. In the US, calls to reintroduce tougher drug laws resonated with the wider
conservative offensive against the putative “soft on crime” inclinations of liberal
policymakers in the post-civil rights era.32 Opponents of legalization sought to
challenge the public health frame that gained increasing influence in the wake of the
Shafer Commission’s Report and to contextualize the issue of cannabis use as yet
another symptom of a putative law and order crisis in American cities. The
proliferation of grassroots parents’ movements lobbying for the stricter regulation
of marijuana provided considerable political momentum for the introduction of
tougher penalties for trafficking and possession offenses.33
The process by which cannabis prohibition norms again became settled at the
national level in the US provided facilitative conditions for the increasing
involvement of the federal government in exporting its drug policies to other
countries. This effort became increasingly consequential in an historical moment in
which the US came to perceive itself “not just as a powerful state operating in a
30.
NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF
MISUNDERSTANDING 150 (1972).
31. DUFTON, supra note 25, at 69–70.
32.
JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A PUBLIC OF FEAR (2007).
33. DUFTON, supra note 25, at ch. 8.
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world of anarchy” but as “a producer of world order.”34 With the end of the Cold
War, new discourses of “securitization” emerged as part of the search for a new way
of grounding America’s internationalist engagement.35 Drug policy became
increasingly aligned with national security issues pertaining to the activities of
insurgent and terrorist groups in Latin American countries and to the risks posed
by these groups to the democratic stability and peace in the region.36 This new frame
of diagnosing the implications of the illegal drug trade led to the development of
new modes of defining the goals of US counternarcotic policies as well as the
strategies through which such goals should be pursued. These new strategies have
sought to reduce drug production at the source, to combat drug trafficking en route
to US borders, to dismantle international illicit drug networks, to reduce drug
demand at home and abroad, and to incentivize foreign governments to cooperate
with US counternarcotic goals. The institutionalization of these strategies
necessitated strengthening the capacity of the US government to influence the drug
policies of other countries and to dominate the transnational agenda of cannabis
control.
From the mid-1980s onwards, the US government institutionalized an array
of multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral measures intended to coerce, induce, and
socialize other countries to cooperate with its counternarcotic strategies.37 Its
multilateral efforts have largely been based on the extensive funding and support of
international and regional organizations that are committed to the prohibitionist
approach. In this context, the US has consistently pushed for an expansion of the
International Narcotic Control Board’s monitoring authority and has served as a
staunchest defender of its prohibitionist policies.38 Building on and expanding the
scope of the international obligations enshrined in the Vienna Convention and the
INCB recommendations, the US has made extensive use of bilateral treaties to
create an issue-linkage between states’ willingness to adopt zero-tolerance models
of drug policy and their eligibility for foreign aid. Over the next decades, such
bilateral agreements provided a basis for the operation of extensive cooperation and
capacity-building projects in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Colombia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Peru, Ghana, Thailand, and many others.
Along with these multilateral and bilateral instruments used to influence the
drug policies of other countries, the US government has had an extensive reliance
on unilateral tools of imposing economic and reputational sanctions on
noncompliant states. In 1986, Congress introduced the Omnibus Drug
Enforcement, Education, and Control Act, which created a certification process for

34. G. John Ikenberry, Power and Liberal Order: America’s Postwar World Order in Transition, 5 INT’L.
REL. ASIA-PACIFIC 133, 133 (2005).
35. Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 83, 102–07
(2010).
36. DOUG STOKES, AMERICA’S OTHER WAR: TERRORIZING COLOMBIA (2005).
37. McLeod, supra note 35, at 108–31.
38. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 272.
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drug-producing and drug-transit countries.39 The certification process requires the
president to withdraw financial assistance and support in multilateral lending
institutions from countries that fail to comply with requisite benchmarks of antidrug policy. To enable congressional deliberations over such sanctions, the US
Department of State submits an annual International Narcotic Control Strategy
Report (INCSR) that identifies the major illicit drug-producing and drug-transit
countries and evaluates the extent to which their domestic policies are in compliance
with the US counternarcotic agenda. The INCSR narrative explores a wide range of
countries (e.g., 70 countries in the 2018 report). The certification process is applied
to countries included in what came to be known as the Majors List (which included
22 countries in 2018).40
The success of the US to coerce and to induce dozens of countries to adopt
its preferred models of implementing cannabis prohibitions promoted convergence
of drug laws across jurisdictions and thus increased the degree of concordance
between the transnational and the national levels of this TLO. However, the global
diffusion of tougher cannabis laws cannot be sufficiently explained by focusing on
the coercive mechanisms employed by the US alone. This diffusion was also a
product of broader social transformations stimulating increasing political
mobilization around law and order issues during the final decades of the twentieth
century.41 Illustrating Durkheim’s observation that societies have a functional need
to construct categories of deviance,42 the instigation of moral panics concerning
drug abuse epidemics provide a useful tool of identifying “suitable enemies” and
scoring political points.43 In an era during which a broader shift from welfareoriented to punitive-focused approaches to governing social marginality took
place,44 strengthening state capacities to condemn and to penalize drug dealers and
users proved to be a far more attractive project for politicians than undertaking to
address the public health implications of drug use.
As the primary international organization responsible for monitoring the
implementation of the UN drug conventions, the INCB played an important role
in facilitating the concordance between the transnational and national levels of the
cannabis prohibition TLO. In its annual reports, the INCB has repeatedly supported
the “gateway drug thesis,” according to which the use of cannabis serves as a risk
factor in increasing the user’s probability of using harder illicit substances, such as
FRIMAN, supra note 2.
U.S DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INT’L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFF.,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 2–5 (2018).
41.
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (1st ed. 2001).
42. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY ch. 2 (Steven Lukes ed., W.D.
Hall trans., Simon & Schuster, 2d ed. 1997) (1893); Robert Reiner, Crime, Law and Deviance: The
Durkheimian Legacy, in DURKHEIM AND MODERN SOCIOLOGY 175 (Steve Penton ed., 1984).
43.
Nils Christie, Suitable Enemies, in ABOLITIONISM: TOWARD A NON-REPRESSIVE
APPROACH TO CRIME 34 (Herman Bianchi & Rene von Swaaningen eds., 1986).
44. LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL
INSECURITY (2009).
39.
40.
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amphetamine, cocaine, or heroin. Based on this thesis (whose scientific validity was
and remains controversial),45 the Board’s 1983 Report criticized those “circles in
certain countries” that “apparently assume that to permit unrestricted use of some
drug, regarded by them as less harmful, would permit better control of other drugs
which they deem more perilous to health.”46 This criticism was leveled at supporters
of the separation of markets strategy, which came to be endorsed by Dutch
policymakers at the time.47 In its later reports throughout the 1980s and 90s, the
Board adopted an increasingly critical stance toward the Dutch attempts to
depenalize cannabis usage. In its 1997 Report, the selling of cannabis in coffee shops
was depicted as “an activity that might be described as indirect incitement.”48 The
focus on the Netherlands and its singling out for disapprobation reflects the rarity
of open contestations of the prohibitionist imperatives enforced by the Board
during that period.
III. THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The extensive institutionalization of the cannabis prohibition TLO
throughout the 1980s and 1990s facilitated the international spread of tougher laws,
severer penalties, and more aggressive policing strategies. However, the very success
of this TLO to propagate its policy models highlighted its failure to deliver on its
own promise to reduce the prevalence of cannabis use and to eliminate its illicit
supply chains. The intensification of enforcement activities also brought into focus
the adverse human rights impacts of implementing the prohibitionist cannabis
policies. The increasing criticisms of the failures and boomerang effects of the
cannabis prohibition TLO prompted both internal and external processes that
eroded its legitimacy and compromised its ability to continue guiding the practices
of legal actors at the national and local levels.
From the early stages of the institutionalization of the cannabis prohibition
TLO, it became vulnerable to criticism of its inherent input legitimacy deficiencies. As
discussed earlier, the central role played by the US in shaping the goals and strategies
of this TLO has largely depended on the exercise of unilateral measures of coercion
and inducement. The degree to which the certification process has realized basic
standards of transparency, inclusiveness, and accountability is obviously limited.
The procedures by which the INCB defines and applies its compliance criteria seem
conspicuously insulated from ongoing public debates regarding the impact of
cannabis prohibition laws on marginalized populations. These legitimacy deficits are
conveniently set aside by proponents of the war on drugs, who tend to focus more
45.
JULIA BUXTON, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NARCOTICS: PRODUCTION,
CONSUMPTION, AND GLOBAL MARKETS 110–11 (2006).
46.
INT’L NARCOTIC CONTROL BD., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC
CONTROL BOARD FOR 1983, U.N. Doc. E/INCB/1983/1, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XI.6 (1984).
47.
Henk Jan Van Vliet, Separation of Drug Markets and the Normalization of Drug Problems in the
Netherlands: An Example for Other Nations?, 20 J. DRUG ISSUES 463 (1990).
48. Int’l Narcotic Control Bd., Report of the International Narcotic Control Board for 1997,
at 6.
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on the ability of these measures to promote global public goods than on the quality
of the processes through which these measures are created. As Niko Krisch
observes, such tendency to prioritize output legitimacy considerations is pronounced
in various contexts of global governance and often produces pressure to move
toward more informal and hierarchical modes of transnational governance in these
issue-areas.49 However, this view is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain in
the issue-area of cannabis policy given the mounting evidence on the failure of this
TLO to achieve its regulatory goals. Despite billions of dollars of investment and
extensive law enforcement resources, a sizable body of scholarship has documented
the growing availability of the drug during the 1990s, the widespread prevalence of
its usage among adolescents, and the increasingly tolerant attitudes toward cannabis
consumption among both users and non-users.50
Drawing analogies to the failure of the “Noble Experiment” of the alcohol
prohibition period,51 criminologists developed thorough critiques of the underlying
assumptions of the cannabis prohibition TLO. The assumption that the availability
of cannabis can be meaningfully reduced by the deployment of militarized policing
strategies (such as the aerial spraying of crops) has been criticized for overlooking
the resilience of cannabis markets and their high levels of adaptability to changes in
their regulatory environments. Studies have shown that rather than eliminating
supply chains, such interventions served to disperse, displace, and fragment supply
sources and distribution routes.52 In turn, such interventions precipitated a spillover
of armed violence to new geographical areas and exposed otherwise uninvolved
indigenous populations to new risks and insecurities. The inherent flaws of this
dimension of the cannabis prohibition TLO are often illustrated by referencing the
“balloon effect” metaphor, depicting the ways in which efforts to suppress the
cultivation of cannabis in one geographical area causes a convenient shift of its
production elsewhere.
The legitimacy of the cannabis prohibition TLO has also been damaged by
evidence regarding the immense human rights violations that the implementation
of war on drugs policies has entailed. Advocacy networks led by prominent
transnational NGOs, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
have exposed the disproportionate punishments imposed under the banner of the
war on drugs in various countries. In the US, such criticism focused on the
contribution of marijuana prohibitions to the nation’s internationally unparalleled

49. Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2014).
50. Peter Reuter, The Political Economy of Drug Smuggling, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
DRUG INDUSTRY: LATIN AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 128 (Menno Vellinga ed.,
2003).
51. Harry Levine & Craig Reinarman, Alcohol Prohibition and Drug Prohibition: Lessons from Alcohol
Policy for Drug Policy, in DRUGS AND SOCIETY: U.S. PUBLIC POLICY (Jefferson Fish, ed. 2006).
52. BOWLING, supra note 3, at 118–20.
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incarceration rates and its distinctive patterns of racially-skewed law enforcement.53
A recent ACLU report using data extracted from the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Reporting Program indicates that between 2001 and 2010, there were over eight
million marijuana arrests in the US, of which 88% were for marijuana possession.54
In 2010, there were more than 20,000 people incarcerated for the sole charge of
cannabis possession. Outside of the US, human rights activists focused on the
increasing use of capital punishments for drug offenses from the late 1980s onward,
as part of the broader escalation of enforcement efforts during the war on drugs
era.55 The exportation and importation of illegal drugs constitute capital offenses in
more than 30 countries. In China, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines, the death
penalty is exercised regularly for cannabis trafficking offenses.
By the mid-1990s, the criticism leveled at the cannabis prohibition TLO began
to stimulate increasing advocacy activity in favor of reform. These activities failed
to change the direction of drug policymaking at the international level. Indeed, the
“outcome document” issued in the wake of the 2016 UN General Assembly Special
Session on drugs kept in place the existing framework of cannabis prohibition and
did not endorse the calls to reclassify cannabis as a less dangerous drug. However,
the criticism of the prohibitionist approach had a considerable transformative
impact on the development of drug policies at the national and subnational levels.
Before long, the diffusion of liberal cannabis policies across national borders began
to jeopardize the normative settlements institutionalized by the cannabis
prohibition TLO in previous decades.
The efforts to liberalize cannabis regulations have focused on three distinct
models of reform: depenalization, decriminalization, and legalization. Under formal
depenalization regimes, the possession of cannabis is still formally prohibited;
however, such prohibitions are enforced through intermediate justice measures
rather than through conventional penal sanctions such as incarceration. The
Netherlands pioneered the experimentation with depenalization strategies in 1976
when it formalized the use of the expediency principle to guide the enforcement of drug
prohibitions. Based on this principle, Dutch prosecutors are instructed not to bring
charges when cannabis use offenses take place within the user’s home or within the
so-called coffee shops, where cannabis can be openly consumed and purchased.56 From
the 1990s onward, many national and subnational jurisdictions introduced cautioning
and diversion schemes to deal with drug use offenses.57 Cautioning schemes authorize
police officers to avoid arresting suspected drug offenders under certain
circumstances. Instead, the cautioning schemes require them to issue a written
53. MICHELE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012); DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL
UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (2007).
54. ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 4 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/
sites/default/files/field_document/1114413-mj-report-rfs-rel1.pdf.
55.
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(2017).
56. VAN SOLINGE, supra note 26, at 516.
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warning of the possible consequences of the illegal behavior. Diversion schemes,
which may operate at the pre-trial, pre-sentence, or post-conviction stages of the
legal process, are intended to shift offenders from the criminal justice system and
its carceral institutions to other channels of legal intervention. When applied before
the sentencing stage, such measures may require the offender to participate in
certain treatment and education programs as part of the bail conditions. After the
sentencing stage, diversion measures may subject a convicted offender to
community-based or rehabilitative measures (e.g., community service and
therapeutic programs).
The widespread transnational diffusion of depenalization regimes is enabled
by the structural mismatch between the actors shaping the formal rules of the
international drug control system and those implementing these rules in national
and local contexts.58 The diffusion of these regimes was not initiated by
international organizations or powerful countries. Rather, it has evolved through
uncoordinated processes of institutional isomorphism, reflecting converging
professional concerns regarding the complexities of implementing criminal
prohibitions that are extensively violated by ordinary citizens and that do not reflect
widespread social disapprobation of the targeted activity. From the perspectives of
ground-level enforcement officials and more senior bureaucratic elites, the
implementation of cannabis prohibitions raised pragmatic concerns regarding the
limited effectiveness of conventional penal measures and the immense costs that
such efforts entailed.
In democratic systems committed to the principle of legalism, it seems natural
to expect that schemes of depenalization would translate into de jure changes in the
statutory definitions governing processes of criminalization. The international drug
conventions place constraints on the ability of national legislatures to introduce such
reforms. However, the treaties also contain textual ambiguities that provide leeway
for negotiating the scope and ambit of such prohibitions. The rise of the medical
cannabis movement illustrates the unfolding of such processes of normative
contestation. The movement began to gain ground in the early 1990s, focusing its
efforts on promoting ballot initiatives at the municipal and state levels in the US.59
Within the next two decades, it effectively initiated the enactment of laws
decriminalizing the medical use of marijuana in thirty-one states across the US and
inspired norm entrepreneurs in dozens of other countries to campaign for the
adoption of similar models. Countries adopting medical cannabis laws utilize the
latitude allowed by the UN drug conventions regarding the definition of the term
“medical and scientific purposes.” Importantly, they challenge the powerful view
(which has long been defended by the US federal government and the INCB) that
marijuana has no demonstrated medical use. In this regard, the medical cannabis
movement has demonstrated the effectiveness of bottom-up legal mobilization
58. Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity of Global Lawmaking: A Sociolegal Agenda, 5 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 263 (2009).
59. DUFTON, supra note 25, at ch. 12.
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strategies operating at the subnational level to contest authoritative interpretations
of transnational prohibition norms produced by powerful global actors.
Building on the successes of the medical marijuana reform movement,
advocacy networks in various countries have campaigned for the enactment of more
radical models of decriminalizing and even legalizing the recreational use of
cannabis. The seeds of this development were sown in the 1990s when European
countries increased the thresholds of the amounts of cannabis possession exempted
from criminal responsibility. Portugal, for example, adopted threshold parameters
based on “the quantity required for an average individual consumption during a
period of ten days.”60 Whereas Portugal adopted this policy as part of a
comprehensive redesign of its drug laws on the basis of harm reduction principles,61
in other countries, these steps toward legalizing cannabis use were stimulated by
court rulings reviewing the constitutionality of cannabis prohibitions. For example,
in Argentina, a 2009 ruling by the Supreme Court struck down Article 14 of the
country’s drug control legislation, which punished the possession of small amounts
of cannabis with prison sentences ranging from one month to two years.62 The
Court stated that the possession of cannabis is protected by Article 19 of Argentina’s
Constitution, which states that “private actions that in no way offend public order
or morality, nor are detrimental to a third party, are reserved for God and are
beyond the authority of legislators.” Recent developments in Canada and nine US
states signify the growing momentum of the trend toward the legalization of
recreational uses of cannabis and the development of more complex regulatory
models to govern legal cannabis markets.63 In different ways, these jurisdictions
grant licenses to professional farmers and pharmacies to produce and to sell
cannabis commercially and exempt individuals from criminal responsibility for noncommercial uses.
The trend toward liberalizing cannabis prohibitions illustrates the recursive
nature of transnational processes of legal change. The networks of actors
participating in these processes—comprised of grassroots activists, legislatures,
bureaucratic elites, criminal justice actors, scientists, journalists, and public health
officials—created new regulatory models that gradually transformed the application
of cannabis prohibition norms in various jurisdictions. These actors invoked the
indeterminacy of treaty provisions, contested the framing of cannabis use as
indicative of a moral malaise, and highlighted the diverse ways in which the
enforcement of cannabis prohibitions produces social harms that are severer than
those generated by cannabis use. They also utilized the space for norm-making
provided by the mismatch between the institutions and actors that formulate global
60. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 157.
61. Catlin E. Hughes & Alex Stevens, What Can We Learn from the Portuguese Decriminalization of
Illicit Drugs, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 999 (2010).
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63.
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norms and those assigned with the actual implementation of these norms in national
and sub-national settings. The success of these campaigns warrants a reflection on
the conditions under which (and the extent to which) local and national acts of
contesting TLOs can reshape the agenda of global actors invested in preserving the
current normative settlements. The following section focuses on this question.
IV. AFTER THE WAR ON DRUGS?
The rapid and widespread transnational diffusion of new models of
decriminalizing, depenalizing or legalizing the use of marijuana serves as a product
and a catalyst of the declining capacity of the cannabis prohibition TLO to shape
the policy choices of criminal lawmakers and the routine practices of enforcement
officials. However, to what extent do these reforms change the agendas of the global
actors that play key roles in shaping and maintaining the normative and institutional
structures of this TLO?
Faced with the global spread of cannabis liberalization reforms, the INCB has
positioned itself as the most steadfast defender of the normative expectancies of
the cannabis prohibition TLO.64 In its annual reports, the Board contested the
legitimacy of the legal interpretations underpinning states’ engagement with
decriminalization, depenalization, and legalization initiatives. The Board repeatedly
expressed its concern that the introduction of civil sanctions for possession offenses
was sending the wrong signal, downplaying the health risks of marijuana use. It
criticized medical cannabis reforms and questioned the scientific basis on which
they are premised. Most recently, the Board condemned Uruguay and Canada for
adopting legalization schemes, stating that such reforms constituted clear breaches
of the international conventions.
The literature examining the roles of naming and shaming mechanisms in
international politics observes that most countries are inclined to bring their laws
into formal compliance with international standards to avoid being stigmatized as
“deviant states.”65 The efforts of the INCB to achieve such influence by
condemning countries deviating from the prohibitionist expectancies of the
international drug conventions failed to generate such adaptive responses.66 Some
countries have practically ignored the Board’s proposed interpretation of the
international obligations set by the conventions. Others have argued that the
Board’s interpretive approach was too narrow and relied on selective use of the
available evidence-base concerning the medical uses of cannabis. Still others
contended that the Board was exceeding its mandate when it adopted a hostile
stance toward legitimate policy choices of sovereign states.67 The limited impact of
the Board’s attempts to delegitimize the adoption of non-punitive models of
64. BEWLEY-TAYLOR, supra note 8, at 219; Friman, supra note 2, at 153.
65.
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cannabis regulation provides important insights into the conditions under which
naming and shaming strategies can succeed.68 One reason for this limited impact is
that some of the central countries pioneering the experimentation with
decriminalization and legalization schemes are not particularly vulnerable to
economic and reputational pressures.69 Supporters of cannabis liberalization
reforms across Europe and North America justify these policies on the grounds that
they are needed to reconcile drug policies with fundamental human rights values as
well as with human development concerns.70 In this polemical context, it is
unsurprising that the INCB, which has long failed to restrain the human rights
abuses inflicted in the name of the war on drugs, has not succeeded in harnessing
transnational civil society actors to support its line of attack on the perceived
departures from the settled interpretations of the international drug conventions.
Whereas the INCB has remained unambiguously committed to the task of
defending the normative settlements of the cannabis prohibition TLO, the
approach taken by the US has been marked by ambivalence.71 President Barack
Obama’s administration adopted the ambiguous position of respecting the decisions
of US states legalizing the medical and recreational use of marijuana while
continuing to condemn steps toward legalization in Latin American and Caribbean
countries. Responding to shifts in national public opinion, the administration set
out lenient guidelines for the federal prosecution of marijuana users in states that
had legalized its medical and recreational uses.72 It thereby allowed legalized drug
markets to take roots in Colorado and Washington, and subsequently in other states.
Like other national governments, the US federal government invoked its domestic
constitutional principles (particularly the principles governing the distribution of
legislative power within the US federal system) to argue that its policies are in
compliance with the international standards. However, during the same period, the
US continued to apply its strict punitive approach to evaluating the compliance of
other countries with the UN drug conventions. The annual certification process
continues to include assessments of the extent to which the seventeen countries
currently identified as “drug majors” are willing to eradicate the cultivation of
cannabis and to penalize its growers and sellers. With a majority of Americans
supporting the legalization of marijuana (64% according to a 2017 Gallup Poll)73
and a majority of US states already implementing decriminalization schemes for
medical marijuana, lawmakers in the House and Senate are facing increasing
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pressure to end the federal ban on cannabis. Despite efforts by Attorney General
Jeff Sessions to revive the zero-tolerance approach of the federal government,
President Donald J. Trump has recently expressed his intention to support such
reforms. It is too early to predict whether and when such a change will take place
or how it will impact the federal government’s foreign policy stance on the issue of
cannabis legalization. However, as long as the US adheres to this “do as I say, not
as I do” message, its ambivalent posture enables further steps toward the unsettling
of cannabis prohibition norms.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that despite its declining regulatory
effectiveness, the cannabis prohibition TLO continues to exert considerable
influence on the development of drug policies at the international, regional,
national, and local levels. In this context, it is notable that countries that have
liberalized their cannabis laws emphasize their commitment to remain bound by the
confines of the current treaty regimes of the international drug control system.
Remarkably, the extensive recognition of the severe failures and counterproductive
effects of the cannabis prohibition TLO has not generated viable political efforts to
amend the international treaties underpinning its operation. To a considerable
extent, the reluctance to renegotiate the treaty norms governing cannabis policies
stems from the notion that the cannabis prohibition TLO is embedded within the
mega-TLO of the international narcotic control system.74 This serves as a powerful
mechanism of issue linkage, leading countries that support cannabis liberalization
reforms to avoid initiating formal treaty amendments out of concern that such
actions might destabilize the settled norms prevailing in other issue-areas of narcotic
control (e.g. the norms governing the regulation of illicit markets of heroin, cocaine
and synthetic opiates). The fact that the UN drug conventions regulate the global
trade of both the illicit and licit uses of drugs, including substances on the World
Health Organization’s list of essential medicines, further escalates the stakes in
renegotiating the terms of these treaties. In addition, the reputational costs of
defecting from UN crime suppression treaties might be higher than those suffered
by persistent objectors in other areas of public international law. The branding of
countries as pariah states, or “narco-states,” as it were, carries a stigma that resonates
with the censuring functions performed by criminal labels in domestic contexts.75
These factors help explain why current efforts to restructure the regulatory
frameworks governing cannabis markets are contained within the narrow space of
policy experimentalism created by the textual ambiguity of the current treaties.
Under these circumstances, many of the inherent weaknesses of the prohibitionist
approach resurface (though in a more attenuated form) in the new regulatory
landscapes created by the decriminalization and depenalization of possession
offenses. The involvement of criminal organizations in illicit drug markets remains
significant given the illegality of supply-related activities. The growing formalization
74. For a discussion of mega-TLOs, see HALLIDAY & SHAFFER, supra note 12, at 495.
75.
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of intermediate sanctions has a net-widening effect, which expands the use of
control measures against low-risk drug offenders.76 Most fundamentally, the
insistence on promoting drug liberalization reforms within the confines of the
current system constrains the capacity of individual states and of the international
community to imagine more effective and humane alternatives, such as those
offered by harm-reduction and development-centered approaches.
CONCLUSION
Transnational legal orders both enable and constrain the development of new
regulatory models. The enabling function of TLOs rests not only on the
institutionalization of measures of negotiating, codifying and implementing legal
norms with a global reach, but also on their tendency to generate dynamics of
resistance and contestation which are conducive to the production of new norms
and institutional forms.77 This chapter analyzed the ways in which such acts of
norm-making unfolded in the issue-area of cannabis prohibition, driven by recursive
mechanisms such as legal indeterminacy, diagnostic struggles, actor mismatch, and
ideological contradictions. The discussion has also demonstrated that even when
they undergo processes of fragmentation and polarization, TLOs can constrain the
capacity of these acts of contestation to generate new normative settlements.
Mindful of Niels Bohr’s advice that “prediction is very hard, particularly about the
future,” we conclude this chapter by hoping that a better understanding of how
transnational legal orders facilitate and hinder recursive legal change can illuminate
some of the possible trajectories for the future development of cannabis regulations.
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